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Abstract—We present an observational study on the relation-
ship between demographic factors and phishing susceptibility
at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC). In
spring 2018, we delivered phishing attacks to 450 randomly-
selected students on three different days (1,350 students total)
to examine user click rates and demographics among UMBC’s
undergraduates. Participants were initially unaware of the study.
We deployed the Billing Problem, Contest Winner, and Ex-
piration Date phishing tactics. Experiment 1 claimed to bill
students; Experiment 2 enticed users with monetary rewards;
and Experiment 3 threatened users with account cancellation.
We found correlations resulting in lowered susceptibility based
on college affiliation, academic year progression, cyber training,
involvement in cyber clubs or cyber scholarship programs, time
spent on the computer, and age demographics. We found no
significant correlation between gender and susceptibility. Con-
trary to our expectations, we observed greater user susceptibility
with greater phishing knowledge and awareness. Students who
identified themselves as understanding the definition of phishing
had a higher susceptibility than did their peers who were merely
aware of phishing attacks, with both groups having a higher
susceptibility than those with no knowledge of phishing. Approx-
imately 59% of subjects who opened the phishing email clicked
on its phishing link, and approximately 70% of those subjects
who additionally answered a demographic survey clicked.
Index Terms—Phishing, social engineering, cyber demograph-
ics, user susceptibility, cybersecurity, Billing Problem tactic,
Contest Winner tactic, Expiration Date tactic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Typically, the most important and devastating vulnerability a
company can have is its very own people [10]. The human fac-
tor, or error, is responsible for 95% of security incidents [10].
Malicious actors aim to use social engineering to exploit users
into giving up valuable and confidential information [14]. We
present results from a study of susceptibility of undergraduate
students to phishing emails. In phishing, a fraudulent entity
tries to gain user information, possibly poising as an authority.
This observational study is the first to examine age, gender,
college affiliation, academic year progression, time spent on
a computer, cyber club/cyber scholarship program affiliation,
cyber training, and phishing awareness demographics in one
study. Our motivation lies in understanding dependent vari-
ables in a student population for future training tailored to
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individual students. We hope our results will help businesses
and colleges improve their cybersecurity practices.
As summarized in the tables and figures, our contributions
are the correlations among demographics and phishing suscep-
tibility from our observational study in which we sent phishing
emails to 1,350 UMBC students. For more details, see Diaz
[1].
II. PREVIOUS WORK
There have been few phishing and general cybersecurity
related surveys conducted on college students in the past,
focusing on the correlation between susceptibility and one or
few demographics.
Farooq, et al. [8] studied 1280 participants in six different
colleges throughout India, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, and
Thailand. They documented Internet use and its correlation to
the student user susceptibility level. A year prior, Farooq, et. al.
[9] also surveyed 614 university students from eight different
majors to calculate their information security awareness score
(ISA). They concluded that gender provides an insight on how
a student learns cybersecurity skills. Men tend to gain security
knowledge through self-taught means, while women tend to
prefer formal training and interacting in their social circles
[8].
In Tamil Nadu, India, Senthilkumar and Easwaramoor-
thy [15] surveyed student responses to cyber themes, such as
“virus[es], phishing, fake advertisement, popup windows and
other attacks in the internet” [15]. In this study, only 10 of the
379 students stated that they would report any malicious activ-
ity to their cyber crime office. Similarly, Kim [12] surveyed a
group of business undergraduate students on their knowledge
of cyber related topics . While the students were somewhat
knowledgeable on most topics covered in NIST Standard 800-
50, Kim [12] suggested training programs for all students
within the college to increase student awareness. Duggan [6]
conducted a comparable survey in Japan, where he surveyed
a group of Japanese college students about their cybersecurity
and privacy-risk knowledge based on terminology.
Dodge Jr., et al. [4] conducted an unannounced phishing
test on students at the United States Military Academy to
evaluate their cyber training programs. They concluded that the
more educated a student was in academic year, the less likely
they were to fall for the phishing scam. Similarly, Aloul [2]
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
06
07
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
4 N
ov
 20
18
presented a project in which a fake website portal recorded the
number of students who navigate to this phishing trap. They
recorded 9% of the 11,000 students falling for the fraudulent
portal.
Sheng, et al. [16] studied if age, sex, and education level
influenced phishing susceptibility. They determined that higher
education level, age, and being male lead to less susceptibility.
Sun, et al. [17] investigated links between gender and behavior.
In contrast, the research team did not find a significant
difference in gender. In these two studies, the users knew
that they were being tested on their ability to detect phishing
attacks.
In our study we include a more expansive list of demo-
graphics than those explored in previous studies. We also focus
on phishing susceptibility rather than on general cybersecurity
topics, and we do not inform the participants beforehand of
the phishing experiments.
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
We deploy three phishing experiments on randomly-selected
students at UMBC. To simulate errors found commonly in
phishing attempts, these phishing emails contain errors that
provide clues of their illegitimacy. Subsequently, we sent a
debriefing statement to all selected students, as required by
our UMBC Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. We
also sent a survey to gather more demographic data to those
students who had opened a phishing email.
A. Subject Population
Our study takes the 11,234 undergraduate students currently
enrolled at UMBC as the target pool [18]. UMBC is especially
well known for science and technology. UMBC includes three
colleges: the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences,
the College of Engineering and Information Technology, and
the College of Natural and Mathematical Sciences. Our study
focuses on the student’s primary major, regardless of any
subsequent major, minor, or certificate program [18].
We sent each phishing email to a randomly-selected set of
1,350 students. Each set comprised 450 students, with 150
students from each college.
We decreased the number of eligible students from 11,234
to 10,920, marking students ineligible if they had an undecided
major or if they were part of the interdisciplinary studies
track. Interdisciplinary Studies majors have multiple majors
in potentially different colleges.
B. Experiment 1: PayPal
Experiment 1 deployed the popular Billing Problem tactic
[5]. The fraudulent entity claims to be PayPal, a popular online
payment company. The email tries to entice the user to click
on the email link by claiming to have received an order from
them and therefore billing their PayPal account.
There are several red flags that indicate this email is
illegitimate. Atomic Empire Designs is a fake company with
invalid customer service email and phone number. The Ship-
ping Address is vague, and the zipcode is incorrect for the
Baltimore region. The email timestamp is for a future time,
and the total amount of money owed does not add up to the
subtotal, plus tax and shipping expenses. The last line of the
email stating that “Paypal is located at ...” lists an incorrect and
invalid address. Another flag is the sender’s email address: any
email from the PayPal business will have a “@paypal.com”
address, not “gmail.com”. The link described as Order Details
is also suspicious. If one hovers over the link, it does not
indicate any association with PayPal; instead, it goes through
a tracking url that contains a “thisisnotmalware” string.
Fig. 1. Experiment 1 PayPal email claims to bill the student’s PayPal account.
C. Experiment 2: Quadmania
In this Experiment we make use of UMBC’s Quadmania
event, the university’s major spring weekend festival, to lure
the user through monetary gain [7]. The email congratulates
the student on their $100 Amazon prize and asks them to
click the provided link. This email adds legitimacy by using
the 2018 Quadmania banner while the signature of the email
proclaims it was sent by the UMBC Events Board. This name
is similar to the Student Events Board (SEB) that organizes
Quadmania. Futhermore, the email describes a UMCP survey.
Not only was no such survey conducted, UMCP refers to the
University of Maryland, College Park, which is a different
school. There are grammar and spelling inconsistencies, in-
cluding the keynote singer 21 Savage. When hovering over the
link, The user can see the link redirects them to cnn.com after
going through a tracking software. The email is sent from a
“@umbcalerts.com” address, instead of a “umbc.edu” address.
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Fig. 2. Experiment 2 Quadmania email offers a free $100 gift certificate.
D. Experiment 3: DoIT
This email is a variation of the Expiration Date tactic, mim-
icking UMBC’s Division of Information Technology (DoIT).
It claims that the user must verify their credentials to keep
their UMBC account, referencing the Quadmania phish to add
validity. The email threatens that the user must click and verify
their identity within 48 hours.
There are several spelling and grammar errors, which are
uncommon for official UMBC communications. The authority
names itself “Department of Institutional Technology,” and
later signs off with “UNCP DoIT”. There is no Department
of Institutional Technology nor UNCP entity at UMBC. The
odd quote at the end of the email is out of character and
unconventional for a university’s IT department. The email
address and link of this email are suspicious as well. The user
can hover over the link and see that it goes to the Google
homepage after going through tracking software. The email
address has a “@umbcdoit.com” email address instead of a
“@umbc.edu” one.
E. Debriefing Statement and Demographic Survey
Part of our IRB protocol requires us to send a debriefing
email that informs all 1,350 selected students of the study.
It also assures that we anonymized all data, kept all data
confidential, and could not identify any individual.
We invited students who were part of the 1,350 target
group and opened a phishing email from Experiments 1-3 to
participate in a survey. After asking for consent and ensuring
the survey respondents were at least 18 years of age, we asked
questions on their academic year, major affiliation, gender,
age, past cybersecurity training, participation in cyber clubs
or cyber scholarship programs, phishing awareness, and time
Fig. 3. Experiment 3 DoIT email threatens to suspend the student’s computer
account.
spent per day on the computer. We gave a brief definition of
phishing and quick tips on how to identify phishing emails.
We directed the users to the official UMBC phishing and spam
FAQ page for more information.
F. Data Collection
To track the data, we used the free application MailTracker
by Hunter and the EmailTracker by cloudHQ [3] [11]. Each of
these programs tracked if an email recipient opened an email
and whether they clicked any links. Both verify and confirm
each other’s recorded data.
G. Statistical Methods
We applied Fisher’s Exact test and Pearson’s Chi-Square
for significance testing, and Cramer’s V to test strength of
that significance, with α = 0.05 [13]. We used Fisher’s Exact
test in lieu of the Chi-Square test when an expected value
is less than 5. We defined the null hypothesis as there is no
dependency between the demographic factor and student click
rate. We used IBM’s SPSS to create contingency tables and
calculate these statistics.
IV. RESULTS
Of the 1,350 students randomly selected for this study, 1,246
(92%) opened a phishing email in at least one of the three
experiments. We sent the debriefing statement to all 1,350 stu-
dents, and the demographic survey only to those 1,246 students
who opened a phishing email. Except for college affiliation,
we analyzed demographics only from survey respondent data.
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Fig. 4. Number of clicks on phishing emails by students in the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences (AHSS), the College of Engineering and
Information Technology (EIT), and the College of Natural and Mathematical Sciences (NMS).
A. Experiment 1 Results
Of the 450 students receiving the PayPal phishing email,
409 (91%) opened the email. Of those 409 students, a majority
of the Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences majors clicked
the link.
We sent emails to 150 students within each college and
analyzed the actions of those who opened the email. 74% of
students in Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences majors had
clicked the link, with 20% in Engineering and Information
Technology and 55% in Natural and Mathematical Sciences.
B. Experiment 2 Results
We sent the Quadmania phishing email to 450 students,
of which 419 (93%) opened the email. 349 students (83.3%)
clicked the link within the email. Almost all of the Arts, Hu-
manities, and Social Sciences majors clicked the link (95%),
often within minutes of receiving the email. 74% of students
in the College of Engineering and Information Technology
clicked the link, while 83% in the College of Natural and
Mathematical Sciences clicked.
C. Experiment 3 Results
93% of students opened the third email. 68% of students in
the Arts, Humanities, and 49% Social Sciences and Natural
and Mathematical Sciences were fooled into clicking the
link. In contrast, only 31 students (22%) in Engineering and
Information Technology majors clicked.
D. Survey Results
Of the 1,246 students who had the option to complete
the survey, 482 students (39%) responded within a seven-day
period. For each cohort, at least 100 subjects completed the
survey. Figure 4 shows the click action by college membership
for each experiment.
V. ANALYSIS
We analyze all experiments and survey results and find sig-
nificant correlations in all tested demographics except gender.
Table 1 lists the number and percentages of students who
clicked on phishing emails, with the results listed separately
for students who were sent emails, opened emails, and an-
swered the demographic survey.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS. NUMBER OF STUDENTS WHO
CLICKED ON PHISHING EMAILS, AMONG STUDENTS WHO WERE SENT
EMAILS, OPENED THE EMAILS, AND ANSWERED THE SURVEY.
Approximately 59% of the subjects who opened the email
clicked on the phishing link, with some fluctuations among
the three experiments. By contrast, approximately 70% of the
survey respondents clicked.
A. Experiments
We found a correlation between college affiliation and
user click action. For all three experiments, the Chi-Square
value exceeded 5.991. The aggregate data also had a Chi-
Square value exceeding the critical value, rejecting the null
hypothesis. We define the null hypothesis as there being no
4
Fig. 5. Click action by demographic factors for students who opened email and returned the demographic survey form.
TABLE II
SIGNIFICANCE OF THREE STATISTICAL TESTS AT SEPARATING STUDENTS
WHO CLICK ON EMAILS, COMPUTED SEPARATELY FOR EACH PHISHING
EMAIL, AT CONFIDENCE LEVEL α = 0.05, WITH GIVEN DEGREES OF
FREEDOM (DF).
correlation between user susceptibility and a demographic. A
low-to-medium strength of association is also present.
B. Comparative Analysis
We show that phishing awareness, hours spent on the
computer, cyber training, cyber club or cyber scholarship
affiliation, age, academic year, and college affiliation are
significant variables to student susceptibility.
The aggregated college affiliation demographic indicates
that STEM majors–with Engineering and IT majors in
particular–had lower click rates (EIT 65%, NMS 70%) com-
pared to non-STEM majors (AHSS 80%). Increasing academic
year progression saw a decrease in student click rate. We
observed that increased time on the computer and cyber
training correlated with lower click rates. Students in a cyber
club or cyber scholarship program also clicked the phishing
TABLE III
SIGNIFICANCE OF THREE STATISTICAL TESTS AT SEPARATING STUDENTS
WHO CLICKED ON A PHISHING EMAIL, BY DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS, AT
CONFIDENCE LEVEL α = 0.05, WITH GIVEN DEGREES OF FREEDOM (DF) .
link less often than did students with no such affiliation. Within
the cyber club and cyber scholarship group, students who were
affiliated with a cyber scholarship program had lower click
rates compared to the cyber club students.
Contrary to our expectations, in Experiments 1–3, students
who were unaware of phishing attacks performed better (28%
clicked) than did students who were aware (42% clicked) or
who understood what phishing attacks are (80% clicked).
We found no significant correlation between gender and
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susceptibility, with the Chi-Square calculation less than the
critical value.
VI. DISCUSSION
We describe the campus response to our phishing emails,
discuss an unexpected finding, comment on the nature of the
phishing emails, identify study limitations, and present open
problems.
A. Campus Response
Although the PayPal email received little attention, the
Quadmania phish (purportedly from SEB) created notable
confusion. SEB, DoIT, and campus police issued alerts. A
few hours after we sent the emails, SEB posted warnings to
the student body of a phishing scheme, informing users that
they did not send the Quadmania email, spreading word on
the myUMBC dashboard and social media.
SEB’s quick and efficient communication reached several
students within the Experiment 2 cohort. Despite these warn-
ings, the vast majority of students had already fallen for the
Quadmania scheme. Many students who were deceived by the
phish reported their experiences to DoIT or SEB, prompting
quick responses by SEB and DoIT to us and the student body.
While we had notified DoIT in advance, not all of their staff
knew about our experiment, and in hindsight, we probably
should have also informed SEB in advance.
B. An Unexpected Finding
As expected, we observed lower user susceptibility with
college affiliation, academic year, age, cyber club and cyber
scholarship affiliation, amount of time spent on the computer,
and cyber training. Contrary to our expectations, we observed
greater user susceptibility with greater phishing knowledge and
awareness.
We have no convincing explanation for this finding, and we
do not know if it is reproducible. Nevertheless, we consider
two speculations. First, it is possible that the act of falling for
the phishing scheme might have increased the user’s awareness
about phishing. In hindsight, it might have been wiser to have
asked in the post-event survey what was the level of phishing
awareness the user had when they opened the phishing email.
Second, it is conceivable that users who fell for the phish might
be more likely to overestimate their knowledge, including
about phishing.
C. Limitations
Limitations of the study include student awareness of the
experiment and veracity of survey responses. Especially given
the commotion created by the Quadmania phish, it is possible
that there was greater awareness among subjects about the
possibility of phishing attacks in the third experiment than in
the first two. We made no attempt to measure how accurately
and honestly subjects filled out their demographic surveys.
We can analyze the correlation between demographics and
suseptibility only for subjects who answered the demographic
survey. It is likely that survey respondents are a somewhat
biased sample of the undergraduate population—for example,
survey respondents might be less cautious and more likely to
act on opportunities. This bias possibly explains why survey
respondents clicked on the phishing link at a higher rate than
did students who merely opened the phishing email.
D. Nature of Phishing Emails
As explained in Section III, we intentionally inserted many
clues into each phishing email of their illegitimacy (e.g.,
spelling errors), and initially, we did not inform the sub-
jects about the experiments. Our rationale was to simulate
commonly occurring phishing attacks, which often contain
such clues. We do not know how much, if it all, such clues
affected user behavior. Similarly, we do not know how much,
if at all, lack of awareness of the experiment affected user
behavior. Given the high click rates, we speculate that, for
many users, such clues were not a decisive factor. Similarly,
given that study awareness appears to be a more subtle issue,
and that many users are generally aware about the possibility
of phishing attacks, we speculate that lack of awareness of
study did not make a significant difference.
Alarmingly, given the high click rates for our phishing
emails with many clues, we believe that most users would be
even more highly susceptible to more sophisticated attacks. In
a more sophisticated attack, the adversary might surveil the
target and construct a compelling customized spear-phishing
email free of any obvious clues.
E. Open Problems
It would be interesting to understand our unexpected finding
that students who reported greater phishing knowledge were
more susceptible. Additional studies could explore this ques-
tion and determine if our findings are reproducible. It would be
useful to understand how clues and study awareness affect user
behavior. It would be interesting to include faculty and staff in
a study and to analyze user behaviors over several semesters.
More difficult open problems are to explore causal factors in
user behaviors and to devise effective ways to combat the
threat of phishing attacks, including better user education,
email filtering, and system design.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our study finds an association between several demographic
factors and a student’s susceptibility to phishing attack. We
observed lower susceptibility for college affiliation, academic
year progression, cyber training, involvement in cyber clubs
or cyber scholarship programs, amount of time spent on the
computer, and age demographics. Surprisingly, despite a lower
susceptibility for cyber education or IT expertise, we observed
greater susceptibility for phishing awareness. We found no
significant correlation for gender.
Phishing attacks are a dangerous form of social engineering
that target users every day. Our study shows that user suscep-
tibility to phishing remains a prevalent problem, even among
technology-savvy students: approximately 59% of the subjects
who openened the phishing email clicked on the phishing
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link, and approximately 70% of those subjects who also
answered the demographic survey clicked. Our observational
study uncovers relationships between demographic factors and
susceptibility to phishing. We hope that these findings will be
helpful in designing more secure systems and developing more
effective cybersecurity training for users.
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